Is Certainty Necessary for Knowledge? (2)

From Jason Stanley’s Knowledge and Certainty:

    If one proposition obviously entails another, it will feel redundant to follow an assertion of one with an assertion of the other. So, redundant conjunctions provide evidence of entailments. In the case of the relation between knowledge and truth, we clearly see such evidence of entailment, as is witnessed by the oddity of (22):

    (22) I know that Bill came to the party. In fact, he did.

    We also see similar evidence in the case of the relation between knowledge and belief, as (23) is just as odd as (22):

    (23) I know that Bill came to the party. In fact, I believe he did.

    The reason (22) and (23) are odd is that knowing entails truth and belief. No new information is conveyed by assertions of the second sentences in (22) and (23). So, the utterances seem pointless, and the discourses odd.

    In contrast, we see no such evidence of entailments in the case of subjective and epistemic certainty. In both cases, there is no similar sense of redundancy:

    (24) I know that Bill came to the party. In fact, I’m certain that he did.
    (25) I know that Bill came to the party. In fact, it’s certain that he did.

    The discourses in (24) and (25), in contrast to those in (22) and (23), do not seem odd at all. The assertions of the second sentences seem to add new information to the information expressed by “I know that Bill came to the party”. If knowledge entailed subjective and epistemic certainty, this fact would be a mystery. The discourses in (24) and (25) would be just as odd as the discourses in (22) and (23). If knowledge does not entail subjective and epistemic certainty, this fact is explicable.

From page 6-7 (38-39).

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