Andrew Bailey on (No) Bare Particulars

Check out Andrew Bailey’s forthcoming No Bare Particulars.

Abstract: There are predicates and subjects. It is thus tempting to think that there are properties on the one hand, and things that have them on the other. I have no quarrel with this thought; it is a fine place to begin a theory of properties and property-having. But in this paper, I argue that one such theory—bare particularism—is false. I pose a dilemma. Either bare particulars instantiate the properties of their host substances or they do not. If they do not, then bare particularism is both unmotivated and false. If they do, then the view faces a problematic—and, I shall argue, false—crowding consequence.

Lot’s of good stuff to think about.


2 thoughts on “Andrew Bailey on (No) Bare Particulars

  1. This is a nice paper. However, I like Bare Particulars. Thanks for the post, Adam!
    Did Andrew publish this last year or is it soon to be published?

  2. Looks like it was written in 2010. His website says its “forthcoming.”

    I like BPs too, but it’s hard to know what we mean when we call them “featureless” for all the heavy metaphysical lifting they do. I think he draws attention to the difficulties of grasping some of the proposed ideas of what they could be.

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